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 Abstract: This study will examine if Akhuwat provides a sustainable Islamic 
 interest-free Microfinance model for potential poverty alleviation. This question 
 is particularly complicated for an organization that relies so heavily on 
 subsidies. Theoretical debates of sustainability and the recognition of 
 donations, cross-market comparisons, and data from audit reports will validate 
 Akhuwat’s potential for long term sustainability. Analysis also highlights the 
 discrepancies that plague this opaque industry.  
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I. Introduction 
 
 
 This study will take a closer look at Akhuwat, an innovative Islamic Microfinance 
Institution (MFI) in Pakistan, in order to gain more insight into whether it provides a 
sustainable model for potential poverty alleviation. An estimated 72 percent of people 
living in Muslim-majority countries do not use formal financial services (Honohon 2007). 
With high poverty rates in the Muslim world, microfinance has potential to play a key 
role in providing financial access to the poor.  However, conventional microfinance 
institutions tend to provide products that are incompatible with the financial pillars of 
sharia law within Islam. Most notably, sharia law disallows the use of interest-bearing 
loans. Surveys conducted in Jordan, Algeria, and Syria revealed that 20-40 percent of 
respondents cite religious reasons for not accessing conventional microloans 
(Consultative Group to Assist the Poor1). Despite the high poverty rates in Muslim-
majority countries and incredible market potential, sharia-compliant microfinance 
represents less than 1 percent of the Microfinance industry (CGAP). While conventional 
microfinance has grown tremendously in the past decade, Islamic microfinance growth 
has been slow in comparison (CGAP). Nevertheless, Islamic microfinance is a budding 
industry still in its infancy, with the number of service providers offering sharia-
compliant microfinance products doubling since 2006 (CGAP).  
 Pakistan is considered a promising market for Islamic Microfinance, with 98% of 
the 180 million population being Muslim and a strong cultural focus on a just economic 
system (Haider 2012). Following trends in Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Malaysia, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Henceforth	  “CGAP”	  
2 This means that Akhuwat charges no interest on any of their services. This is different 
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State Bank of Pakistan stepped up in 2007 to create Islamic microfinance guidelines and 
promote growth of Islamic MFIs. This study will focus on Akhuwat, one of the first fully 
Islamic MFIs in Pakistan. To gain insight on Akhuwat’s relative success, this study will 
use sustainability and efficiency indicators to make comparisons between Akhuwat and 
The Wasil Foundation (Wasil), another interest-free MFI. These organizations’ 
performance will also be compared to nationwide and region wide industry averages. 
Comparisons intend to shed light on the potential sustainability of Akhuwat, and gain 
further insight on why the Islamic Microfinance sector has yet to take off in the Muslim 
world.   
 Akhuwat is based largely on charitable funding, with their primary product being 
“Qarz-e-Hasan” (an interest free loan with long repayment periods). Akhuwat, which 
means “brotherhood,” is unique in that its model is developed on the concept of 
community and most branches have been set up in mosques and churches (Haider 2012). 
Because Akhuwat has no profit margin on their loans, the institution relies heavily on 
donations and subsidies, which may have the potential to hamper sustainability in the 
long run. In contrast, the Wasil Foundation offers a range of products that have a profit 
margin and thus does not offer “Qarz-e-Hasan” loans. Their focus remains on enterprise 
as opposed to social values.  
 In addition to making cross-market comparisons, this study will examine the 
theoretical debate behind defining sustainability and will take a closer look at Akhuwat’s 
audits. Discussion and results will call attention to the issues of sustainability faced by 
largely subsidized programs. Data analysis will highlight discrepancies in financial 
indicators provided by Mix Market Database, Audits, and scholarly research, validating 
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the heavy criticism of the opaque nature of the industry. Finally, the study will identify 
potential for infrastructural change in Pakistan to facilitate the success of Akhuwat. 
Findings have the potential to provide valuable insight for other Islamic MFIs that are 
still in their embryonic stages but have great potential to catch up to their conventional 
counterparts.  
 
II. Literature Review 
 
 Recent research has shed a controversial light on microfinance. Since the 
industry’s infancy in the 1970’s, many have deemed microfinance as the most promising 
answer to poverty. The most recent studies, however, argue that this is not necessarily the 
case and that the industry is plagued with inconclusive data and opaque results. Banerjee 
and Duflo (2013) studied the impact of microfinance in a randomized evaluation taken 
from the slums of Hyderabad, India. They found that while microcredit did impact 
household consumption and helped create businesses, there was no detectable effect on 
education, health, or women’s empowerment. Their conclusions are representative of the 
majority of recent literature, but they do add that it may take more time for the 
microfinance sector to cause noticeable change to these major macro indicators. The 
overall impact of microfinance, however, is too complex for the scope of this paper.  
 A 2012 report from the Centre of the Study of Financial Innovation (CSFI) found 
that client over-indebtedness is the most concerning risk in the microfinance industry. 
The report speculates that this may point to wider issues in the sector, raising questions 
about the increasing emphasis on growth and profit of MFIs. It is from this logic that 
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many researchers propose giving to the poor instead of lending to the poor.  Initial 
research on Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) proves promising. Rawlings, Laura (2005) 
claims that there is “clear evidence of success from the first generation of programs in 
Colombia, Mexico, and Nicaragua in increasing enrollment rates, improving preventive 
health care, and raising household consumption.” A study by Kabeer and Waddington 
(2015), published in the Journal of Development Effectiveness, randomly evaluated 46 
quasi-experimental impact evaluations of CCT. They found that CCT programs 
decreased child labor, increased household consumption and investment, and smoothed 
consumption. Appraisal for non-profit models of financing the poor bodes well for 
Islamic microfinance, which prides itself on social justice and wealth redistribution.  
 While there is an abundance of research on microfinance, Islamic microfinance is 
relatively unchartered territory. Islamic microfinance has been coined as an “emerging 
market niche” by CGAP. A 2007 CGAP survey collected information from over 126 
Islamic MFIs and revealed that Islamic MFIs have a total global outreach of 380,000 
clients, making up only one half percent of the total microfinance outreach. Furthermore, 
the report found that 80% of the global outreach is concentrated in only three countries: 
Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan.  
 Kazim, Syeda and Haider Syed (2012) researched the viability of Islamic 
microfinance in Pakistan. They conclude that there is great need for financial services in 
Pakistan, and that Sharia compliance is oftentimes seen as a necessity before using 
financial services. The study provides a breakdown of the viability of two models of 
Islamic Microfinance, one of which is essentially already being implemented by the 
Islamic MFI Akhuwat. This model is based on the concept of “Waqf,” meaning the 
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dedication of a resource in the way of God. Waqf resources can be used only for 
charitable purposes, and the charitable investment must be self-perpetuating, like lending 
money to a poor person so they can learn a skill or start a business.  According to the 
report, a Waqf-based microfinance is one of two viable Islamic Microfinance models for 
Pakistan. It allows Islamic MFIs to grant “Qarz-e-Hasan” loans, meaning without 
interest, and thus expand in scale and increase outreach by gaining geographical 
coverage. However, they note that Waqf is not a sustainable source of funds as it relies on 
community benevolence and no current legal framework exists that redirects funds 
collected by Waqf-based non-profit organizations to Islamic MFIs.  Furthermore, the 
report points out that existing regulations do not allow organizations like Akhuwat to 
mobilize savings as a source of self-funding. The authors propose that these organizations 
attempt to receive patronage from charitable organizations in Pakistan, while admitting 
this may be a tedious process.  
 Muhammad Naveed (2014) draws evidence from the Islamic Microfinance 
network already in place in Pakistan and concludes that Islamic microfinance is “playing 
an important role improving the living standard, per capita income, awareness level, 
ethical values, profitability, infrastructure position, and employment level in the society” 
as well as improving unequal distribution of wealth.  Farooq and Khan (2014) compiled 
data on the social and financial performance of two Islamic and two conventional MFIs 
in Pakistan, all rated with four stars by Mix Market database. The article pulled 
information on productivity, profitability, portfolio quality, social indicators and financial 
structure of each organization from 2005 through 2010. These are commonly used 
measurements in microfinance studies, specifically studies comparing the performance of 
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conventional versus Islamic microfinance. They found that Islamic MFIs were more cost 
effective, based on “Cost Per Borrower” and “Operating Expenses to Assets.” Akhuwat 
had the most efficient employees, followed by a conventional MFI. The conventional 
MFIs beat out the Islamic MFIs in financial efficiency, with a higher ratio of “Financial 
Revenue to Assets.” The study found mixed results for financial performance based on 
portfolio quality and profitability indicators. While the report found no source of concern 
regarding portfolio quality across all four MFIs, profitability indicators were not 
promising. Asasah, a conventional MFI, was the only organization that showed a positive 
return on equity. It is important to note that there was missing data for several of the 
years observed. Further, data from Mix Market is self-reported and thus discrepancies 
and errors are likely.   
 There is still plenty of research to be done on the viability of Islamic 
Microfinance. As of now, there are few studies that incorporate accurate and up to date 
qualitative or quantitative client data from Pakistani Islamic institutions such as Akhuwat 
and The Wasil Foundation. Information from Mix Market and audits, as well as up to 
data information from Akhuwat Headquarters, will provide original and valuable insight 
on the sustainability of the organization. 
 
III. Akhuwat: A Closer Look  
 
 To understand the mechanics of Akhuwat it is important to identify the founding 
principles of the organization. Akhuwat is one of only a few institutions in Pakistan that 
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offers a fully sharia-compliant product line. 2Islamic scholars believe that interest, or 
“riba”, is inherently exploitative and that money should be used purely a mean of 
transferring funds and has no intrinsic value. Thus, it is unlawful to make a profit off of 
money itself.  Akhuwat, still in its infancy, has offered a fully sharia-compliant product 
line since 2001. Their vision is to create “a poverty free society built on principles of 
compassion and equity” (Akhuwat). Dr. Saqib, the founder of Akhuwat, explains that the 
interest-free loans of Akhuwat ensure that the hard work of borrowers does not go to 
waste (Saqib 2012). Akhuwat’s perspective on interest is described on their website: 
 In addition to ideological reasons, high interest rates may contribute to 
 exacerbating the plight of the poor as recent global evidence has demonstrated. 
 For Akhuwat, by using money to earn money, not only does wealth remain 
 concentrated in the hands of a few but the direction of financial flows remains 
 from those who have little to those who have more. In keeping with the principles 
 of equity and social justice, burdening the poor with exorbitant interest rates is 
 also viewed as undermining the overarching goal of poverty alleviation. 
 
 In following this charitable ideology, Akhuwat maintains a portfolio that is 90 percent 
“Family Enterprise Loans” in the form of “Qarz-e-Hasan” (interest-free loans that are 
derived from the teachings of Islam). These loans are eligible to any individual who has 
come up with a viable business plan. This lending model will be discussed in further 
detail later on in the paper.  The remaining 10 percent of the loan portfolio include 
education, health, housing, liberation and emergency loans. 
 Akhuwat’s alignment with Islamic principles extends beyond the interest free loan 
mechanism.  Akhuwat’s linkage with religious space is something that sets the institution 
apart from its counterparts. Both loan introduction programs and loan disbursements are 
conducted at mosques or churches to raise awareness in poor localities. This also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This means that Akhuwat charges no interest on any of their services. This is different 
than a conventional MFI that offers some products interest free.  
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increases transparency and accountability while taking advantage of underutilized space 
and cutting down on overhead operating costs. While the organization is founded on 
Islamic ideals, supposedly no individual is discriminated on the basis of religion or 
gender.   
 In keeping with Akhuwat’s religious philosophical commitment, a central pillar of 
the organization is that “it is essential to look beyond oneself.” Founder Dr. Saqib expects 
today’s borrowers to become tomorrows’ lenders- he says to “pay back a good deed is 
better than a good dead” (Saqib 2012). Akhuwat’s success converting borrowers to 
donors is another key aspect that distinguishes it from other institutions of its kind. The 
growth in donations Akhuwat has received since initiating its Member Donor Program 
(MDP) in 2008 is nothing short of a phenomenon.   
TABLE 1: MEMBERSHIP DONOR PROGRAM3 
Year Donations from  
Borrowers (US 
Dollars) 
Annual Growth 
Rate 
Donations from  
Borrowers as % of Total 
Expenditure4 
2008 $314 NA NA 
2009 $157 (50) NA 
2010 $92,568 59078 35% 
2011 $185,779 101* 31% 
2012 $361,762 95* 36% 
2013 $819,753 127 39% 
2014 $1,401,535 71 38% 
        	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Donation	  numbers	  are	  received	  from	  Akhuwat	  headquarters	  directly.	  Starred 
numbers are different than the growth rate reported by the Islamic Financial Report, 
likely due to error.	  4	  Ratios	  start	  at	  2010	  because	  this	  is	  when	  donations	  reach	  significant	  numbers.	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The numbers in Table 1 have been converted from Pakistani Rupee to US Dollar using 
the approximate exchange rate of USD/PKR 105.45. From 2008 to 2014, donations 
accumulated from borrowers increased from $314 to $1,401,535 dollars. From 2009 to 
2010, donations from borrowers increased a staggering 5,9078%.6 Since then, growth rate 
of donations declined, but have maintained relatively stable, reaching 71% as of 2014. 
According to Dr. Saqib, the founder of Akhuwat, from 2011-2013, donations from 
borrowers alone covered around one third of Akhuwat’s operating expenses. These ex-
borrower voluntary contributions not only bode well for long-term sustainability, but also 
are indicative of a certain level of efficiency of the program, as the ex-borrower is 
financially stable enough to make a donation.  
 Dr. Saqib claimed in 2010 that with the enormous help of donations from 
borrowers, Akhuwat was 60% percent operationally self sufficient and with hopes of 
ultimately being “operationally self-sufficient.”  He tells the Berkeley Center for 
Religion, Peace, and World Affairs: “The way the program is progressing, we believe 
that in few years, the entire operational cost will be matched by donations given by the 
borrowers, and we will be operationally self-sufficient.” Further, Akhuwat’s newsletter 
states that, despite being voluntary, “the Member Donor Program (MDP) has raised 
around 13 million rupees since 2008, and Akhuwat continues to receive large sums of 
money from this source in the form of small donations of Rs. 1-3 per day. The MDP 
currently covers part of Akhuwat’s operational expenses. And, given the momentum with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The USD/PKR exchange rate has since fluctuated to 103.5. However, to maintain 
consistency, the 105.4 rate is used throughout this study to present all numbers in Dollars.  
6 Further research is necessary to understand why this number is so large. It may likely be 
the result of a successful marketing campaign by Akhuwat.	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which it is growing, MDP alone could make the organization self-sustainable in the 
foreseeable future.” While sounding promising, this is a problematic statement in that the 
formulaic interpretation of operational self-sufficiency (OSS) does not include donations 
in revenue, and thus these donations would not help Akhuwat move towards a higher 
OSS percentage. Mix Market, the SEEP Network, the World Bank, and CGAP all 
exclude donations and subsidies from operational income, the numerator of the OSS 
ratio. According to Mix Market, in 2011Akhuwat was 18.74% operationally self-
sufficient. However, this ratio shot up to 99% the following year. It is important to keep 
in mind that these numbers are voluntarily self reported, and that this massive increase is 
either likely due to an error or a change in accounting practices with regard to donations. 
Akhuwat also reported higher operational expenses and lower revenue on Mix Market 
than other studies have suggested. Clarifying these discrepancies will be integral in 
addressing Akhuwat’s sustainability.  
 
IV. Defining Sustainability 
 
 In order to investigate Akhuwat’s sustainability, we will first review the 
prevailing accounting methods used for calculating important sustainability indicators. 
CGAP guidelines state that MFIs should operate without subsidies, relying on private 
investment instead. Similarly, “The New Microfinance Handbook,” by Joanna 
Ledgerwood, advocates that funds donated to cover operating costs (subsidies) should be 
deducted from net income prior to financial performance analysis, as they do not 
represent revenue from operations (Ledgerwood 2014). This ensures that financial 
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statements reflect the true level of expenses that would be incurred if the MFI were to 
operate without any in-kind donations. These guidelines are penalizing to Akhuwat 
because they rely on subsidies such as the free office space of their mosque distribution 
centers and the volunteerism of their employees (who, on average, volunteer about 20 
percent of their time) (Munir 2012). CGAP’s emphasis on non-subsidized sustainability 
is evident in the following Financial Self-Sufficiency (FSS) formula frequently used in 
comparing MFIs: 
 
FSS  =           Business Revenue (Excluding grants and extraordinary items) 
   Total Expenses +CFA +ISA + IA 
 
In the above formula, CFA refers to Costs of Funds adjustment, ISA refers to In-kind 
Subsidy Adjustment, and IA refers to Inflation Adjustment. As shown in the formula, 
goods and services purchased at a subsidized rate are added onto expenses, and thus firms 
are penalized for receiving grants and subsidies. Additionally, grants are not included in 
business revenue. FSS is adjusted to account for subsides and grants so that it can provide 
a fair cross-comparison between the financial health of MFIs that receive subsidies and 
those that do not.  Because this paper approaches sustainability from a welfarist 
perspective, and this formula is particularly penalizing for subsidized firms, we will 
instead focus on another frequently used indicator, Operational Self-Sufficiency (OSS):  
 
OSS =                                    Operating Revenue 
          (Financial expense + Loan-loss provision expense + Operating expense) 
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In this case, operating revenue7 does not include donations or “any revenue that is not 
generated from an MFI’s core business of making loans and providing financial 
services.” It does, however, include financial revenue from loan portfolio. Financial 
revenue from a loan portfolio is defined as “revenue from interest earned, fees, and 
commissions (including late fees and penalties) on the gross loan portfolio only.” In the 
case of Akhuwat, operating revenue excludes a substantial portion of funding which they 
receive from donors. Considering Akhuwat’s key philosophy and strategy is to convert 
borrowers to lenders, then perhaps these donations should be classified as a source of 
revenue received from their institutional efforts and loan portfolio. If one is to consider 
these donations a source of revenue, then this formula is underestimating Akhuwat’s 
operating revenue and thus the calculated OSS may not be an accurate reflection of the 
institutions sustainability.   
 Another formula that subsidized MFIs will systematically underperform in is 
return on assets. According to CGAP, Return on Assets (ROA) also does not include 
donations.  
 
ROA =                  (Net operating income-taxes) 
     Average assets 
 
In order to merit high scores from this formula, as well as the OSS and FSS formulas, 
institutions need to charge interest rates that cover a substantial proportion of operating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Also referred to as operating income. 
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costs. Keep in mind that donations of any kind are not included in net operating income. 
Again, this is a substantial penalization for a firm such as Akhuwat that receives a 
significant chunk of funding from its own borrowers. Based on the basic accounting 
definition, assets are “resources owned by a company and which have future economic 
value that can be measured and can be expressed in dollars.” Canada Non-Profit 
Accounting (CICA) guidelines state that “a contribution receivable should be recognized 
as an asset when it meets the following criteria: (a) the amount to be received can be 
reasonably estimated; and (b) ultimate collection is reasonably assured.” It is without 
question that the loans made by Akhuwat to borrowers are assets, even though the 
situation is unique in that there is no return of interest. What is more arbitrary is what we 
may include in the return on these assets. While it is clear that in the case of Akhuwat, the 
processing and service fee will be recognized as return, what about the voluntary 
contributions that are received directly from borrowers in appreciation of these loans?  
 Scholars have recognized the unique accounting situation of the ex-borrower 
donations of Akhuwat. Benedetto and Bengo (2014) write: “…from a technical point of 
view, ex-borrower donations can be considered as voluntary loan repayments not in terms 
of principal costs, already repaid, but of additional delivering costs to membership fees.” 
This statement categorizes ex-borrower donations as essentially add-ons to membership 
fees, thus giving validity to its recognition as return. This logic sheds light on the 
controversial debate on whether or not donations should be included in revenue. While 
there is theoretical framework to support the notion that voluntary contributions should 
count as revenue, there also exists a school of thought that takes the opposite stance. 
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Hence we are confronted with the infamous “Microfinance Schism” of institutionists 
versus welfarists.  
 The formulas defined by CGAP, Mix Market and SEEP Network generally align 
with the “institutionist” perspective on MFIs, which argues that MFIs can never attain 
sustainability while receiving such a large chunk of their funding from donors and 
subsidies. However, it is important to note that there are two distinct schools of thought 
on how donations should be treated in the financial assessment of an organization. We 
will take a closer look at both of these perspectives.  
 Woller (1999) writes “Implied by institutionists is that subsidized MFIs are 
inherently inefficient in that the absence of profit motive fails to create the proper 
incentives for management.” Institutionists believe that MFIs should charge interest rates 
that cover their costs, and that the working poor can afford to pay these interest rates 
(Robinson 1996). Further, because targeting the poor and providing small loans induces 
higher costs, these interest rates tend to be very high (Conning 1999). The concept that 
the very poor can afford the high interest rates of fast growing and financial self-
sustaining MFIs has proven questionable over the past decade. The most recent 
assessments of microfinance have shown that client-indebtedness is one of the biggest 
problems facing the industry (Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation8 2012). It 
seems that the poor cannot afford the high interest rates that allow MFIs to remain self-
sufficient. Furthermore, institutionists believe that subsidized programs will fail before 
they reach significant numbers, and thus few low-income entrepreneurs will end up 
benefiting from these programs. This perspective is hard to reconcile with the MFI 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Henceforth “CSFI” 
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experience of the heavily subsidized Grameen Bank as well as the growing client base of 
Akhuwat.  
 On the other hand, “welfarists” argue that MFIs can achieve sustainability without 
achieving financial self-sufficiency in its traditional sense (Morduch 2000). They argue 
that donations are a form of equity and that donors are “social investors.” These investors 
receive the intrinsic return of not investing in firms they find offensive and instead 
investing in firms that will maximize their desired social impact (Brau 2004). While 
institutionalists believe that organizations “cannot rely on government or donors as 
reliable sources of subsidized funding”, welfarists believe that donors are no more 
rational or irrational than any other economic actor and the concern for poverty 
alleviation will never dry up. Further, welfarists criticize the rapid growth of profit 
seeking organizations as contradictory to poverty alleviation. In the case of Akhuwat, 
dependence on local donors means it is not under pressure to scale-up quickly (Munir 
2012).  
 Welfarists propose a new definition of sustainability that bodes well for 
organizations such as Akhuwat.  Breaking away from tradition, they define sustainability 
as the ability to produce outputs that are valued sufficiently by beneficiaries and other 
stakeholders so that the program receives enough resources and outputs to continue 
production” (Woller 1999). For example, a government will likely act as a rational donor 
in that it will not abandon a subsidized MFI if it provides more bang for the buck than 
other social investments. Woller introduces the concept of a “social investor” and 
redefines the meaning of “subsidy” so that a donor-funded MFI achieving significant 
outreach and impact, where its social benefits exceed the alternative social investments 
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should not be considered “subsidized.” Thus, an MFI can be viable in the long term 
despite donor funding reliance. Under these terms, Akhuwat has potential to be 
considered a sustainable and successful institution.  This paper will test the welfarist 
hypothesis while assessing the sustainability of Akhuwat using financial analysis as well 
as qualitative and quantitative client data. Results will deter Akhuwat from striving to 
become subsidy-free, as institutionists theory would encourage. 
 A challenge to keep in mind is that improved social welfare is inherently costly to 
measure. And, although as welfarists suggest donors are no more or less rational than any 
other economic actor, it would be naïve to assume that they can accurately asses the 
impact of their contributions. Traditional microeconomic theory suggests that rational 
consumers determine social benefit and will only purchase a product with net economic 
gain. However, behavioral economics tells us people are not rational; there are many 
ways that they can be fooled into thinking that the social benefit is bigger than the private 
cost of a donation when, in fact, it may not be. So, the important things to consider are if 
a donor is any less accurately able to assess the social impact of their donation than any 
other economic actor is able to assess the payout of his or her investment, such as a 
venture capitalist. Additionally, even if the consumer cannot accurately predict the social 
benefit of his or her investment, as long as the institution successfully convinces him or 
her that the social benefit is higher than the private cost, then they will continue to invest. 
The consumer’s decision to reinvest will signal a positive return on (a more abstract 
definition of) equity.  According to the Stanford Social Innovation Center, Akhuwat’s 
model is groundbreaking in that it challenges deeply entrenched assumptions about 
economic behavior. Many borrowers will pay back Akhuwat before their other interest-
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bearing loans. Being able to pay Akhuwat back in full (as opposed to difficult-to-pay 
back interest-bearing loans) instills in the borrower a strong self-esteem that encourages 
funding another lender. It also likely brings social recognition to the ex-borrower. 
Malcolm Harper, a scholar on enterprise development, writes:  
 Akhuwat’s expansion depends on continuing donations to finance growth in the 
 loan portfolio, and on the continued willingness of the voluntary staff. There is as 
 yet no evidence that these will stop, and although substantial effort has to be put 
 into fund raising, and further initiatives will be required in future, there does not 
 seem to be any reason why a programme which depends on brotherhood, 
 generosity and goodwill should be any less ‘sustainable’ than one which depends 
 on purely financial incentives. 
 
 Joseph Morduch, Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at Harvard 
backs this opinion: 
 “Since donors and governments remain committed to poverty alleviation as a top 
 priority, advocates are not unreasonable in arguing for allocating some poverty-
 alleviation funds to support innovative and effective microfinance programs over 
 the long-term. How this will play out exactly is a matter of speculation, but there 
 is no reason to think that concern with poverty alleviation will quickly whither. 
 Nor is there reason to think that support for subsidized microfinance programs 
 will whither -- as long as they remain vigilant in containing costs and maximizing 
 outreach.” (Morduch, 2000) 
 
 Complimentary to Morduch’s recommendations of remaining vigilant in 
containing costs, it is not profit maximization that makes a program efficient, but having 
a hard budget constraint, which is possible even with subsidies.  A hard budget constraint 
means that even if the firm tries hard to cut its losses, the environment will not tolerate a 
protracted deficit (Kornai 1986). Take, for example, a soft budget constraint where 
performance criteria are not carefully specified and managers can expect to be bailed out 
after poor performances. Containing costs will not be a priority, as managers do not face 
severe consequences of failures to do so (Morduch 2000). With a hard budget constraint, 
a deficit causes fear because it may lead to extremely serious consequences. Kornai 
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distinguishes between the goals and the hardness of the budget constraint by arguing 
“hardness of the budget constraint is not a synonym for profit maximization…profit 
maximization refers to the internal goal setting of the decision maker of the firm: the 
softness-hardness of the budget constraint refers to the external tolerance-limits to losses” 
(Kornai 1986). For Akhuwat, maintaining a hard budget constraint means behaving in an 
entrepreneurial manner and adjusting to unfavorable external circumstances by 
improving the mechanics of the organization if necessary (i.e. cutting costs, introducing 
new products or programs) (Kornai 1986). The firm should be held accountable to a 
certain level of efficiency before being given subsidized funds from private and public 
entities.  As a heavily subsidized organization, Akhuwat should abide by certain 
theoretical efficiency principals. While Akhuwat prides itself on low operating costs, a 
comparison in the following section of operating costs between Akhuwat and the median 
of aggregated MFIs in Pakistan as well as the in South Asia reveals that operating costs 
are relatively high. 
 Another important mechanism for achieving efficiency in subsidized programs is 
to use socially-determined transfer prices and be rigid in evaluating performance 
according to those prices (Morduch 2000). While microcredit managers may not be able 
to lend at an actual profit, they could be lending with a net social gain. Morduch (2000) 
explains how institutions can lend at a net social gain without making a profit. The 
concept is based on the distinction between “transfer prices” and “shadow prices.” While 
transfer prices are internal prices that value capital and can be utilized to compare in 
house performance, shadow prices are adjusted downward to account for the social gains 
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produced by lending.9 In the case of Akhuwat, revenue should be tied to performance 
based on shadow profits. However, shadow prices can be arbitrary. The social gain from 
an interest free loan is likely, to some degree, intangible. In practice, individual 
evaluators and researchers select their own shadow prices, making results problematic to 
compare (Tuan 2008).  
 As Morduch (2000) explains, the “win-win” proposition suggested by 
institutionists where MFIs can simultaneously follow the principles of good banking 
while also successfully alleviating poverty has not proven true. In contrast, achieving 
financial sustainability in its traditional sense (without the help of subsidies) does not 
ensure that an MFI can achieve greater scale and outreach. Likewise, subsidized credit 
programs, contrary to prevailing thought, can be efficient and are not bound to fail.  
 
IV. Cross-Market Comparisons 
 
 This section will analyze various efficiency and sustainability indicators in order 
to compare Akhuwat to The Wasil Foundation (Wasil).  This will include comparing the 
operating expenses, active borrowers, cost per borrower, and write-off ratios of both 
Akhuwat and Wasil, as well as nationwide and region wide averages. Both organizations 
are fully Islamic MFIs that operate on very different models, and thus analysis will 
provide insight on Akhuwat’s relative performance. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Shadow prices are dollar values that are attached to each of the short and long-term 
outcomes that a social program may affect. They are typically used in cost-benefit 
analysis. In this case, capital costs, not the service price, would be adjusted downwards.  
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  First we will highlight the key differences in lending methodology of the two 
organizations. While Islamic microfinance consists of a range of services, Akhuwat relies 
purely on the notion of benevolent lending and thus their portfolio is simple in that it 
consists mostly of Qarz-e-Hassan loans. Akhuwat charges a small service fee of 100 
Rupees upfront (around 94 cents), regardless of the size of the loan. They do not expect 
this to cover their expenses. Akhuwat receives interest-free loans from government 
organizations that go into their credit pool and subsidize their costs. For example, the 
Government of Punjab provided loans to Akhuwat in 2012 and also agreed to subsidize 
all operational costs of the project that their loans were intended for.  
 The Wasil Foundation, on the other hand, has a more diverse portfolio that 
provides services on a partnership basis (Musharakah & Mudarabah), on a trade basis 
(Murabaha & Salam) and on a rental basis (Ijarah) (Khan 2010). The latter (Ijarah) is a 
system where Wasil rents agricultural land and then subleases it to a farmer for an agreed 
period of time. The farmers then pay a monthly rental fee in cash or in the form of crops, 
depending on the food. These agricultural packages represent about 10% of Wasil’s 
portfolio (CGAP 2014). Wasil has also been acclaimed for its “Salam” agricultural 
products (CGAP 2014). Salam offers agricultural clients a cash advance against a 
guaranteed purchase price for their crops. Accordingly, Wasil maintains a large portion of 
the agricultural sector of Pakistan, while Akhuwat has focused on penetrating urban 
areas. Traditional economic theory would predict that Wasil will consistently outperform 
Akhuwat on the basis of its much more diverse portfolio with broader opportunities for 
financial returns on its assets (loans).  However, cross comparisons shown below indicate 
otherwise.  
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 A comparison of various indicators of Akhuwat and Wasil Foundation provides 
further insight into the operating schemes of these two different models of Islamic 
microfinance. Data is taken from Mix Market, which relies on voluntarily contributed 
information from over 2,000 Microfinance Institutions around the world.    For the 
purpose of this comparison, we will use data from the year 2011, as it is the most current 
year with available information on both organizations. We will also include the median of 
an aggregated 27 MFIs in Pakistan for the year 2011, as well as an aggregated median of 
250 MFIs in South Asia in 2011. Comparisons between Islamic and Conventional MFIs 
can be problematic. This is because comparing the risk-sharing products such as 
Musharaka (which is more like an equity investment product) against a conventional 
debt-bearing loan is like comparing apples-to-oranges (El-Zoghbi 2015). Having said 
that, the Qard-e-Hassan loans typical of Akhuwat are also debt instruments, thus making 
a comparison of Akhuwat to the median Pakistan and South Asian MFI not as 
problematic as comparing Wasil to either of the three mentioned.  
 First, let’s start with a basic summary of the main differences between Akhuwat 
and Wasil. In terms of outreach, in 2011 Wasil had 7,257 active borrowers and Akhuwat 
had a much larger portfolio 63,085 of active borrowers.10  In 2011, Akhuwat had a gross 
loan portfolio of $8,059,842 while Wasil had a smaller loan portfolio of $1,390,904. 2011 
Financial revenue was $487,287 for Wasil and $921,849 for Akhuwat. It is surprising that 
Akhuwat’s revenue is almost double that of Wasil considering Wasil’s much more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  While 2011 was the most current year with available numbers for both Akhuwat and 
Wasil, there are more recent individual statistics available on Mix Market that provide 
valuable insight of Akhuwat’s growth. As of 2013, Akhuwat’s portfolio of active 
borrowers totaled a much higher 235, 517 while in 2014 Wasil’s portfolio of active 
borrowers reported in at a 5,482.	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diverse portfolio of profit earning services. Taking a closer look at the statistics, we see 
that Wasil is actually earning a much larger percentage of their revenue from loans, at 
$437,844 as opposed to Akhuwat’s $82,669. Akhuwat’s financial revenue from loans 
consists of the upfront application fee of 100 rupees (approximately 94 cents). This 
implies that Akhuwat either received a massive donation or this is simply an error. 
Taking a closer look at Mix Market, we can see that financial revenue of Akhuwat from 
other years is significantly lower (in 2010 it is $1,249). Again, we have to assume that 
this is either an error or the result of a massive donation or drastic change in how 
donations are recognized. Prior to 2011, Akhuwat’s financial revenue is actually 
consistently lower than Wasil’s, which intuitively makes sense based on the differences 
of their portfolios.  
 Akhuwat prides itself on its low operational costs and philosophy of maintaining 
modest office space, salaries, and equipment. They believe low overhead costs and 
humble conditions are essential if they truly do not intend to profit from their clients. Yet, 
according to Mix Market, in 2011, Akhuwat’s operating expenses totaled  $1,098,747, 
while Wasil’s operating expenses totaled a much lower $582,050. Figure 1 shows 
comparisons of operating expenses between Akhuwat, Wasil, the Pakistani median, and 
the South Asian median.  
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FIGURE 1: OPERATING EXPENSES, 2011 
 
Akhuwat’s operating expenses were also higher than the median for all MFIs in Pakistan, 
as well as the median for all MFIs in South Asia, according to Mix database. However, 
while Akhuwat’s operating expenses are seemingly higher, Akhuwat serves more clients 
than Wasil and the median Pakistani and South Asian MFI (See Figure 2). 
FIGURE 2: ACTIVE BORROWERS, 2011 
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shows the cost per borrower comparisons between Akhuwat, Wasil, the median in 
Pakistan, and the median in South Asia. 
FIGURE 3: COST PER BORRWER, 2011 
 
As shown in Figure 3, the median Cost Per Borrower of MFIs in South Asia is $20.46, 
with the median cost per borrower of MFIs in Pakistan significantly higher at $38.41. 
Although slightly higher than the South Asian median, Akhuwat’s cost per borrower of 
$23.29 is efficient in comparison to Wasil and the median Pakistani cost per borrower. 
However, because Akhuwat touts its low over head costs, modest offices, and partial 
voluntary staff, Akhuwat should minimize costs to be, at a minimum, at the median South 
Asian level, if not below.  
 In addition to touting low operational costs, Akhuwat has been acclaimed for its 
low delinquency rates. As mentioned earlier, Akhuwat attributes this to the sense of 
brotherhood instilled through the close-knit community and its strong religious 
affiliation. The cross-market comparison of Figure 4 uses numbers from 2010 as opposed 
to 2011 due to missing data.   
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FIGURE 4: WRITE-OFF RATIO, 2010 
 
As shown in Figure 4, Akhuwat’s write-off ratio is impressively low. Although these 
figures are from 2010, outside sources report that Akhuwat’s cumulative recovery as of 
June 30, 2013 are still very high at 99.87% (2012: 99.86%).11 The lending scheme of 
Akhuwat will be further discussed later.  
 While these commonly used efficiency indicators make for interesting 
comparisons, assessing sustainability from a self-reported database such as Mix Market is 
complicated. As discussed earlier, sustainability indicators, such as operational self 
sufficiency and deficit/surplus are often reliant on figures that may vary drastically 
depending on accounting standards. On Mix Market, we see incredible volatility in 
indicators such as Financial Revenue, which can ultimately lead to misleading data 
summaries. Figures 1 through 3 are likely fairly reliable as they do not involve income 
calculations, which is where things can get particularly deceptive.  While cross-market 
comparisons from MIX can provide us a general picture of general trends, we need to 
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take a closer look at the figures provided by official audit reports of Akhuwat to put this 
picture into focus.  
 
V. Audits: Financial Indicator Clarification  
 
 To successfully understand the yearly Surplus and/or Deficits of Akhuwat we 
must carefully analyze how Akhuwat accounts for their donations. Akhuwat has hired 
various consulting agencies to do their Audits as of 2008. Deloitte has conducted these 
reports from the years 2012-201412. Typically on these reports, total income is broken 
down into operating and non-operating (or other) income. Total income is then divided 
by expenditure to calculate the deficit or surplus for the year. It is particularly important 
to note that Akhuwat changed their donation accounting policy in their audit report 
published for the year ended June 30, 2012. The notes section 22 of the financial 
statements for year-end June 30, 2012 reads, “During the year, the management has 
changed the accounting policy for recognition of members’ donations. Previously such 
donations were recognized to Income and Expenditure Account which now has been 
changed to recognize these donations to “Donated Funds.”” The new accounting 
measures follow the Restricted Fund Method as described by The Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Pakistan (ICAP). 
  Under this method, the organization classifies its restricted operations by fund 
and recognizes the contributions immediately as revenue of that particular fund. Under 
the Restricted Fund Method, the organization will also have a general fund, which is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 For all Akhuwat Audits, the year-end is June 30th, not January 1st.  
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composed of non-restricted contributions. In the case of Akhuwat, donations used to 
cover loans will go now into a Restricted Fund, while donations used to cover operating 
cost will go into a General Fund. Restricted funds consist of both external and internal 
restrictions. For example, there may be times when the directors of an organization 
decide to use certain contributions for certain purpose, and these would fall under the 
latter type of restriction (See Figure 5). 
FIGURE 5: RESTRICTED VERSUS UNRESTRICTED FUNDS 
Source: ICAP    
    
 This Restricted Fund Method is a widely accepted method. Canadian Non-Profit 
Accounting Guidelines (CICA) also states that revenue is divided into two funds: an 
unrestricted fund and a restricted fund. CICA says the following of the restricted fund: 
  Restricted contributions are subject to externally imposed stipulations as to how 
 the funds are to be spent or used. The organization must use the resources in the 
 manner specified by the donor.  
 
It is important to be aware of the distinction between restricted and unrestricted funds in 
order to analyze Akhuwat’s statements of income and expenditure, and their incurring 
deficit or surplus. Whether or not Akhuwat includes restricted funds in their total income 
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will have a large impact on the incurring surplus or deficit. To further complicate things, 
as mentioned, Akhuwat includes two types of donations in Operating Income: 
Operational Donations and Community Donations. Operational Donations consist of 
donations given by donors for day to day operational expenses and Community 
Donations represents donations collected from donation boxes placed at different 
community centers and retail stores. This is why looking at indicators from databases like 
Mix Market such as “Revenue,” “Income,” “Net Income,” “Surplus,” and “Profit” may 
actually be very unreliable. As we shall see, even within the same organization and 
auditing company, there are fluctuations in income that can be attributed to accounting 
changes. This does not bode well for the reliability of Mix Market.  
 In the case of Akhuwat, as of the year ended June 30, 2012, the Restricted fund 
includes “Donated Funds,” “Contributed Fund,” Takaful Fund,” and a “Rehabilitation 
Fund.” For example, revenue from the “Takaful Fund” is restricted in the sense that it can 
only be utilized to subsidize services of Akhuwat Health Clinic and for paying Zakat.  
Revenue from the “Rehabilitation Fund” is used only for paying stipends to heirs of 
victims of suicide bomb attacks. While donations received by these funds are considered 
revenue for each fund, none of these Restricted Funds are included in what Deloitte 
denotes as Akhuwat’s income for this year. Income, as shown on the Income and 
Expenditure Account, includes “Processing Fee,” “Other Income,” “Community 
Donations,” “Operational Donations,” and “Income from AHS Clinic.”  It is important to 
distinguish between donations intended for covering operating costs and donations 
intended for sustain loan disbursement. Note 4.7 of the audit report states: “Grants 
received for providing loans are directly recognized in the Donated funds. Other funds 
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provided by the donor to subsidize operating and administrative expenses are recognized 
directly as income, in the period of receipt.” Thus, donations intended for subsidizing 
operating expenses will be recognized in the General Fund and thus as operating income, 
while donations intended for loan disbursal will go into the restricted “Donated Fund.” 
Whether or not this “Donated fund” is included in total comprehensive income that goes 
into calculating the surplus will change over the course of 2012-2014, as we will see 
below.  
 First, we will take a look at Akhuwat’s Total Income (Operating and non-
Operating) in comparison to its Operating Income over the period of 2011-2014. 
 
FIGURE 6: AKHUWAT INCOME AS REPORTED IN AUDITS, 2011-2104 
 
The most obvious thing of interest from Figure 6 is the massive jump from 2012 to 2013 
in both Operating and non-Operating Income. These jumps can be attributed partially to 
changes in funding, but also to changes in accounting. First, we will address the change 
in accounting by looking at the 2013 figures in the 2014 Deloitte audit. While in the 
previous audit (year-end June 30, 2013) Total Income comes in at $2,410,263 for 2013, 
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in the 2014 audit Total Income comes in at $3,854,184 for 2013. While Operating 
Income (including processing fee, community donations, service fee, operational 
donations, and income from AHS clinic) remains constant for both audits, the 2014 audit 
report increases the scope of non-operating income in 2013 to include revenue from the 
restricted “Donated Fund.” More specifically, the report includes $1,211,864 from 
“Donations received during the year,” which is the amount of donations received from 
general public which are used for providing interest free micro loans. Prior to this year, 
revenue from this restricted fund was not included in total income and consequently not 
included in total comprehensive income (deficit/surplus). Thus, Figure 6 can be deceptive 
in that it depicts a massive change in the mechanics of the organization. 
 The jump in operational income is due to an almost three fold increase in the 
“service fee,” which in this case represents service charges received from Punjab Small 
Industries Corporation (PSIC) and the Youth Affair Department, both government 
agencies. PSIC provided an interest free loan of Rs. 2,000 million to be used on a 
revolving basis to provide interest free micro loans. Akhuwat is entitled to receive service 
charges of 7% of the disbursed amount from PSIC to meet its operational needs. The 
jump in Operational Income is also due to an increase in Operational Donations from 
$123,311 to $488,609.  
 In order to provide a visual with more consistent comparisons over the course of 
2011-2014, the following figure uses income excluding “Donated Funds” across all four 
years.  
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FIGURE 7: AKHUWAT TOTAL INCOME (ADJUSTED), 2011-2014
 
 
As shown in Figure 7, there are still notable increases in income from 2012 to 2013 even 
when excluding donations from members that are streamed into the Restricted Fund. As 
mentioned earlier, this increase can be attributed to an increase in service fee and 
operational donations.  
 Notable increases in income from 2012 to 2013 coincide with significant 
increases in total expenditure. Fortunately, total expenditure is not affected by changes in 
donation recognition across the four years, and thus does not need to be adjusted.  
FIGURE 8: AKHUWAT TOTAL EXPENDITURE, 2011-2014 
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Akhuwat’s audit for the year-ended June 30, 2013 shows significant increases in salaries, 
wages and other benefits from the year 2012 to 2013. In 2012 this category totaled 
$1,006,258 and in 2013 it increased to $2,082,725. There were also significant increases 
in Travelling and Conveyance, Rent, Staff Training, and Miscellaneous. This may be an 
indicator of an expansion including a substantial increase in human capital.  
 Now that we have taken a look at total expenditure, we can produce two different 
deficit/surplus graphs, one using the total income and one using the adjusted total 
income. First we will look at the deficit/surplus graph which one would construct from 
the figures readily available on Akhuwat’s statements of income and expenditure. 
FIGURE 9: AKHUWAT DEFICIT/SURPLUS FOR THE YEAR, 2011-2014 
 
This graph bodes well for Akhuwat, showing an impressive transition from a deficit in 
2012 to a relatively large surplus in 2013. However, recall that these ratios are based on 
an inflated income total in 2013 in comparison to past years due to the inclusion of 
revenue from the restricted funds. Thus, the following figure has been created using 
consistent calculations for total income. The increase in expenditure from year 2013 to  
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FIGURE 10: AKHUWAT ADJUSTED DEFICIT/SURPLUS FOR THE YEAR 
 
2014 is realized in Figure 10, which shows that excluding Donated Funds, Akhuwat 
actually experienced a rather large deficit in 2014. While this is far from a catastrophe, as 
Akhuwat has seemingly recruited a fairly reliable stream of donor deposits in their 
restricted revenue, it gives us insight that is impossible to see from Mix Market. Akhuwat 
should work on minimizing their operating costs by maintaining a hard budget as advised 
earlier. While Akhuwat’s increase in expenditure from 2013 to 2014 may be justified by 
a possible one-time expansion, it is not matched with significant increase in processing 
fees over the course of the year. Operating expenses should be checked and if such 
expenses increase without coinciding increases in operating income, then Akhuwat 
should undergo severe consequences/changes.  
 Now that we have clarified various income discrepancies, we can now go on to 
produce consistent OSS figures. How we define operating income will have significant 
impact on these figures. It seems most appropriate to abide by The Institute of Chartered 
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because they allow for (at least a portion of) donations and subsidies to be included in 
operating incomes, which is the numerator of OSS. Thus, unlike the total income figure 
we used to determine the (deficit)/surplus, we will be abiding by OSS formula and 
including solely Operating Income in the numerator. In a sense, our formulas now 
capture a hybrid model of OSS by utilizing ICAPs definition of operating income and 
thus including subsidies.  
TABLE 2: OPERATIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF AKHUWAT, 2011-2014* 
2011   
OSS= $122,698/$592,030= .21 
2012   
OSS =  $788,270/$1,006,258= .78 
2013  
OSS= $2,150,342/ $2,082,725= 1.03 
2014  
OSS= $2,166,474/ $3,642,686= .59 
*In accordance with ICAP’s operating income standards   
What is impressive about these numbers is that Akhuwat comes fairly close to reaching 
full OSS (and does in 2013) without including the substantial revenue accumulated in the 
Donated funds. There are still donations included in operating income in the form of 
community and operational donations that are explicitly given with the intention of 
covering operational costs, but if we were also to include the donations received from ex-
borrowers in the OSS formula, Akhuwat will be fully self sufficient. Let’s take for 
example the most recent financial year: 
TABLE 3: 2014 ADJUSTED OSS 
Year Adjusted OSS Formula Adjusted OSS 
2014 OSS = Operating Income +Member Donations/ 
   Operating Expenditure +Financial Expenditure 
OSS=$2748255/ = 1.3 
         $2,082,725 
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We see from Figure 11 that OSS in the year 2014 increased from .59 to 1.3 when the 
Donated fund was included.  If, as discussed earlier in regard to the Return on Assets 
indicator, we can define donations from ex-borrowers as a legitimate source of financial 
return on assets, then this Adjusted OSS Formula is actually more representative of 
Akhuwat’s overall financial health.  
 One of the most commonly cited criticisms of the microfinance industry is the 
lack of transparency. From the past overview of some of the complications of 
sustainability indicators, it is clearly understandable why consumers are wary of the self-
reported numbers of MFIs as well and the resulting aggregated statistics. The numbers 
calculated in Figure 10 using the audit report are significantly different than what is 
shown on Mix Market.  On Mix Market, Akhuwat’s OSS was .995 in 2011 and .1875 in 
2010. In regard to OSS in 2010, we can now revisit with more clarity Dr. Saqib’s vague 
but highly important statement in 2010 that, when including ex-borrower donations, 
Akhuwat was 60% Operationally Self-Sufficient. In November of 2010, Dr. Saqib stated: 
  It is interesting to note that around sixty percent of our costs are met by 
 donations from our borrowers. We inspire them to donate as much as they  want in 
 return for the interest free loan. Without any compulsion or coercion, they are 
 giving  donations to meet operational costs; this makes us 60 percent self-
 sufficient. The  way the program is progressing, we believe that in few years, the 
 entire operational cost will be matched by donations given by the borrowers, 
 and we will be operationally self-sufficient. 
 
From this statement, it is unclear if Dr. Saqib means that donations from borrowers alone 
makes Akhuwat 60% self-sufficient, or their income statement including donations from 
borrowers makes them operationally self-sufficient- an important distinction. From the 
2010 audit report by A.F. Ferguson & Co., it is clear that Dr. Saqib cannot be referring to 
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the member donations alone covering 60% of operational costs (See Appendix 1). This 
leaves the alternative of either operating income covering costs or total income covering 
costs. To add in another confusing layer, operational income is not distinguished from 
total income in the audit report, so we will have to do some guesswork based on the more 
resent audit reports from Deloitte. The closest answer we get to Dr. Saqib’s estimate 
based on the audit report is by dividing Operational Income (Total Income-“Other 
Income,” as seen done by subsequent audits).  
TABLE 4: Operational Self Sufficiency, 2010 
2010 OSS= Operating Income/ 
Expenditure 
OSS= $179,317/$262,925= .68 
 
         
As you may recall from earlier in the section, these calculations are made from the 2010 
audit, before changes were made to exclude donations from members from the income 
statement. So, although Akhuwat has seemingly made little progress on the sustainability 
from based on OSS indicators since this year, it is at least partially due changes in the 
recognition of donations.  
 The discrepancies we see on Mix Market and through the media are indicative of 
why it is so essential to take a closer look at often-called “opaque” industry and set the 
record straight. While Akhuwat can clearly stretch their accounting data to manipulate 
their OSS, which MFIs may have already been doing on Mix Market, this should neither 
be the goal of the organization or the point of this study. On the contrary, an organization 
such as Akhuwat should not have to prove itself as financially sustainable, at least in its 
traditional sense. As Benedetto and Bengo write, “[Akhuwat] reaches financial 
sustainability in an innovative manner: transforming ex-borrowers into donors…”. 
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VI. Lending Methodology and Gender Dynamics  
 
 A key sustainability consideration of Akhuwat is the lending scheme. In 
Akhuwat’s initial years, it utilized the group-lending scheme popularized by long 
standing organizations such as Grameen Bank. However, Akhuwat phased out the group 
loan strategy as of 2006 because group leaders were found to manipulate position and 
extort money. According to Akhuwat’s Decade Report, “Most group members were 
selected on the basis of their popularity in the locality and not on their genuine need for 
credit” (Akhuwat 2010). Further, members complained that the regular group meetings 
were taking up too much time and the poorest of the poor found it difficult to form or join 
a group. Others complained that they simply did not want to work in groups; that they 
were individualist by nature and wanted the same accountability that better-off people 
received from big banks. Akhuwat was aware that they could use the individual lending 
as a ‘selling point’ to attract new clients. Despite international experience, which shows 
that group loans are more likely to be repaid on time than loans to individuals, Akhuwat’s 
“individual household borrower”, also known as its “family loan” model, has higher 
repayment rates than the prior method (Harper 2011). The table below shows differences 
in repayment rates between the two schemes, as cited by Harper: 
TABLE 5: REPAYMENT RATE BY LENDING SCHEME 
Lending Scheme  Average Repayment Rate 
All Schemes  99.7 % 
Group Loans 98.8% 
Individual Household Borrower 99.9% 
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 Akhuwat’s reasoning for transitioning to family/individual loans also had to do 
with problematic gender dynamics resulting from prior MFI’s experiences. Akhuwat 
believes that the prevailing emphasis of lending to women has led men to feel inferior 
and marginalized, thus prompting an increase in domestic violence towards women. 
According to evidence from Bangladesh, domestic violence was often severe; there were 
numerous accounts of men throwing acid and disfiguring women’s faces (Harper 2011). 
This is one of the reasons that Akhuwat places much less emphasis on lending to females 
compared to other MFIS. Figure 11 shows that according to 2011 Mix Market data, 
females made up only around 30% of Akhuwat’s total borrowers.  
 
FIGURE 11: PERCENTAGE OF FEMALE BORROWERS, 2011 
  
 As opposed to the widely accepted MFI practice of loaning mainly to women, 
Akhuwat started experimenting with a family loan model, in order to “strengthen family 
relationships rather than to promote conflict. ” Akhuwat found that staff had to spend less 
time on each loan, as they only had to visit the applicant to check on his or her income 
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level and reputation in the community (Harper 2011). Harper explains the family lending 
model: 
  Wives and husbands were required to sign loan agreements, or mothers and sons, 
 or fathers and daughters, and the loans were known as family loans. Every 
 member of the family knows that they have taken a loan, and this creates a sense 
 of unity in the household and avoids duplication of loans in the same family. The 
 entire family is the guarantor and the beneficiary. Borrowers are also required to 
 bring two other guarantors, who are not from the same household, to co-sign 
 their loans, in order to replace the group guarantee. These guarantors do not 
 have to be any wealthier than the people whose loans they are guaranteeing; they 
 have merely to be respectable people in the same communities who know the 
 applicants well and are prepared to stand behind them. 
 
Once the loan is disbursed, the Unit Manager monitors the client with regular visits to his 
residence and place of work. If the loan is not repaid within the three days of its due date, 
a Unit Manager will pay a reminder visit to the client. If the repayments are still not made 
the guarantors are contacted and asked to make the repayment. From the information 
given, one may be dubious of whether or not this method really facilitates female 
independence, rather than constraining them through the authority of requiring a male 
guarantor. The absence of a “mother to daughter” type loan agreement suggests the latter 
possibility.   
  A sample list of borrowers received from Akhuwat headquarters was analyzed 
for the purpose gaining further understanding of the gender dynamics at play with their 
Family Lending model. The sample cannot be assumed to be a random sample as it is 
made up of approximately a 50/50 split of men to women, which is far from reflective of 
the actual ratio of male to female borrowers. The sample list includes the borrower’s 
name, followed by the first (presumably) guarantor’s name, their date of birth, the 
purpose of the loan, the amount, the gender of the borrower, the date of disbursement, 
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and whether or not they donated to Akhuwat. Despite this not being a random sample, 
there are several noteworthy points we can gather from this document. 
 First, the majority of guarantors are male- for both female and male borrowers. Of 
the female borrowers, at least 70% had male guarantors13. Keep in mind that this 
guarantor is in addition to the family style agreement- likely made between the woman 
and a male in the family. While the family loan model may have the intentions of 
reducing male violence towards females and improving family relationships, it seems that 
using a model solely because it won’t disturb preexisting misogynistic family 
relationships is not progressive. However, the effect of these family dynamics on 
women’s empowerment is beyond the scope or intention of this study, which is to focus 
on the inner mechanics of the organization.  
 Regardless of the immeasurability of the women’s empowerment effect of the 
lending scheme, it is impossible to deny quantifiable repayment rates-which are 
impressive. Akhuwat’s unique lending model, as well as its unprecedented low 
percentage of female borrowers, and most notably its completely interest free product 
line, defies traditional microfinance trends. As Harper states: 
 It is generally accepted not only that they [MFIs] must be ‘sustainable’, that is 
 profitable, in order to survive and to attract and retain investors, but that  MFIs 
 should lend through some form of group mechanism, that they should lend mainly 
 to women, and they should make rather high charges, not only to be ‘sustainable’ 
 but also to discourage misuse of loans to encourage repayment and to ensure that 
 their loans are not hijacked by those who are not needy, as so many subsidized 
 goods and services are…Akhuwat is unique because it breaks just about all the 
 generally accepted rules of microfinance, but has nevertheless survived and 
 grown.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 This figure comes from a sample data set of 500 borrowers provided by Akhuwat 
headquarters. While names of guarantors were provided, genders were not. Hence, 
guesswork was involved in determining gender and this number is approximate.  
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While Akhuwat has indeed survived and grown, there is still a need for infrastructural 
improvement. If a subsidized program such as Akhuwat is to continue at current funding 
levels, it will also need to continue to find modes of constructive engagement with 
government owned agencies, as Akhuwat has done with Punjab Small Industries (PSIC).  
Lessons from past failures suggest that this will require clear understandings of the limits 
to direct government involvement and a commitment to the transparency and 
accountability of programs (Morduch 1998). 
 
VII. Opportunities for Infrastructural Change 
 
 Opportunities for infrastructural change in Pakistan stem from preexisting income 
redistribution mechanisms entrenched in Islamic philosophy.14 Income redistribution is of 
particular relevance in Pakistan, where 22 % of the population lives in poverty and where 
income inequality has worsened over the past several decades (Shirazi 2015).  
Waqf, the concept of “eternal charity,” is derived from the Quran and further developed 
by Islamic scholars in hadith text. Waqf is a pool of resources created through the 
accumulation of both financial and real assets.  It functions essentially as trust system 
used for sacrificing one’s belongings for the sake of charitable purposes. The welfarist 
approval of sustainability bodes well for a Waqf-integrated model for Islamic MFIs, 
particularly for an organization such as Akhuwat. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Mechanisms include the Zakat (an obligatory tax on citizens above a certain wealth 
level that is redistributed to the poor), Sadaqah (a voluntary charity), Qarz-e-Hassan 
(interest-free loans), and Waqf (a religious endowment grounded in Islamic law). 
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 First, lets take a closer look at the mechanics and ideology of Waqf. Cash Waqf 
can either take the form of cash lent for free to the beneficiaries or cash that is invested 
and then the net return is given to the beneficiaries (Dogarawa 2010).  There are typically 
two allotted uses for Waqf, one for family endowment and another for religious or 
charitable purposes. The latter one, called Waqf Khairi, will be the one referred to in this 
paper (Gaudiosi 1988). Waqf is similar to a trust in that property is restricted by 
guidelines (Ahmad 2007). Like a trustee, the head of the Waqf (known as the Mutawalli) 
is responsible for running the organization and spends the wealth according to agreed 
upon rules. Ahmad writes “Countries such as the United States, where trusts are 
prevalent, have agreed to the fact that Waqf is the best way to transfer income from the 
rich to the poor. Thus, Waqf and endowments are both used for the same purposes of 
poverty alleviation and socioeconomic benefits.” The concept of Waqf can be 
distinguished from that of a trust in that the Waqf has to abide by the law of perpetuity-
the concept that charitable endeavors should make continual impact over an indefinite 
period. This is similar to the widely known maxim that we should not simply give a man 
a fish, but teach him how to fish. To compliment this notion, Waqf funds are meant to 
strengthen social bonds. The MFI’s charitable goals of assisting the poor set up 
businesses fit well into this framework.  
 A Waqf-integrated model for Microfinance is particularly well suited for an 
organization such as Akhuwat. Akhuwat has a simple portfolio consisting of benevolent 
loans, and thus relies on inexhaustible social investments in charity. Akhuwat’s loans are 
intended for people living well below the poverty line, and, as discussed throughout this 
paper, the continuation of these loans is reliant on a charitable system. Several studies 
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cite that Waqf could be a potential source of funding Qard-e-Hassan style loans.15 
Further, the welfarist approval of sustainability discussed earlier bodes well for a Waqf-
integrated model for Islamic MFIs.  
 Scholars have laid out some of the problems with the development of the Waqf 
system in Pakistan. The inability of the government to monitor such institutions and hold 
them accountable for the funds as well as the potential for religious disagreements on a 
potential regulatory framework both pose potential challenges. Further, the lack of citizen 
awareness of the existence of Waqf, and the potential for the Waqf fund to feed into 
Islamic microfinance doesn’t bode well for donations (Shirazi 2015). In fact, according to 
studies, Pakistanis held negative associations between the correlation of Waqf and 
microfinance (Shirazi 2015). This means that when asked about the potential use of Waqf 
both in general and in regard to microfinance, respondents gave negative responses. This 
negative association is likely due to the lack of knowledge of Waqf and a consequent lack 
of trust in the potential system. According to the same study, 80% of Pakistani 
microfinance clients surveyed at random wanted to know more about the Waqf system. It 
is essential that MFIs build confidence in the eyes of the public in order to build in an 
infrastructure in which they could tap into these resources (Shirazi 2015).  Thus, we 
revisit the welfarist perspective that relies on the donor as a “social investor” in order to 
create a sustainable cash flow.  
 Despite potential obstacles, there is substantial literature that proposes the 
development of a cash Waqf fund in Pakistan. Kazim and Haider (2012) review Ahmed’s 
“Waqf-based Microfinance: Realizing the Social Role of Islamic Finance” to asses its’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 (Kazim 2012), (Shirazi 2015), and (Ahmed 2007) all mention Waqf in connection with 
Qard-e-Hassan loans 
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viability in Pakistan. They provide two ways in which the Waqf could be set up. One 
would be from a state department, where provincial governments could choose to allocate 
a certain amount of funds to setting up microfinance operations in certain regions.  
Pakistan has already made movements in this direction. In 1959, the Waqf Properties 
Ordinance was introduced in order to bring Waqf properties under the control of the state. 
Waqf properties were traditionally managed by the supposed decedents of the saints of 
the properties, likely passed down generation to generation. It is of no surprise that 
income generated by these properties was used for the personal benefit of the owners of 
these properties. The 1959 Ordinance allows provincial government to oversee Waqf 
properties falling under their jurisdiction. In the year 2010-2011, the Waqf Board Punjab 
generated roughly $9,600,160 from these Waqf estates. Of this sum, $10,236 was 
available for charitable distribution (Kazim and Haider 2012). Unfortunately, 
microfinance operations would likely face fierce competition in gaining patronage from 
the State and receiving such funds due to high demand. The second mechanism noted by 
Kazim and Haider would be to attain Waqf funds directly from the populace. In a sense, 
Akhuwat is already successfully utilizing this mechanism through their collection of 
community donations.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
 
 Scholars who study MFIs are divided on the topic of sustainability. While 
“institutionists” believe that MFIs need to be operationally self sufficient without 
donations and subsidies to be sustainable in the long run, “welfarists” view donors as a 
reliable source of revenue that can be incorporated in income/expenditure ratios. The 
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logic of institutionists suggests that MFIs need to charge interest rates to cover expenses, 
thus relying on the assumption that borrowers can afford these high interest rates. 
However, the most recent studies on Microfinance have come to the conclusion that 
client over indebtedness is the biggest problem in the industry today.  
 Welfarists have redefined sustainability as the ability to produce outputs that are 
valued sufficiently by beneficiaries and other stakeholders so that the program receives 
enough resources and inputs to continue production. They introduces the concept of a 
“social investor” and redefine the meaning of “subsidy” so that a donor-funded MFI that 
has achieved significant outreach and impact such that its social benefits exceed the 
benefits of alternative social investments should not be considered “subsidized.” Based 
on this theory, we can adjust “operational income” in the OSS formula to include 
donations. Further, we should not penalize Akhuwat for receiving loans below the market 
rate by adding this to the “expenses” denominator of the OSS ratio.  Based on Akhuwat’s 
most recent audit reports, when donations from ex-borrowers are included in operating 
revenue for the most recent financial year-end, their OSS ratio is over 1. Under this 
adjusted formula, Akhuwat should be considered a sustainable model for Islamic interest 
free Microfinance. Additionally, Akhuwat should tap into Waqf beneficiaries to 
compliment client donations and create a more reliable stream of revenue.  
 There are several limitations to these conclusions. As Akhuwat is still relatively 
young at 12 years in operation, it is hard to predict long run sustainability. The act of 
clients giving back to Akhuwat is a trend that only started having a significant impact on 
the organization in 2008, and donation rates have yet to plateau. Further, there are still 
large variations in Akhuwat’s income and expenditures year to year due to growth and 
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capital expenditure. Lastly, there are data inconsistencies across different resources such 
as Mix Market, Islamic MFI Report, Deloitte, and the Akhuwat Headquarters. Further 
studies should consider tracking Akhuwat’s performance over the next decade. While this 
paper only addresses sustainability, future research may want to analyze the efficiency 
and social impact of Akhuwat. Further, because the most recent studies have shown that 
microfinance can be severely problematic, we should question the prevailing 
institutionalist guidelines that penalize reliance on donations and subsidies. 
Research should focus on identifying the strengths and weaknesses of interest-free and 
grant giving institutions in comparison to conventional MFIS that provide interest-
bearing microloans.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   51	  
REFERENCES 
 
A Discussion with Dr. Amjad Saqib, Executive Director, Akhuwat [WWW Document], 
n.d. URL http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a-discussion-with-dr-
amjad-saqib-executive-director-akhuwat (accessed 12.11.15). 
Akhter, W., Jaffri, S.K.., Akhtar, N., 2009. Islamic Micro-finance and Poverty 
Alleviation: a case of Pakistan. 
Akhuwat: A Decade Of Hope (Decade Report), 2010. , Journey of Akhuwat, 2001-2010. 
Akhuwat, Lahore. 
Aslam, M.N., 2014. Role of Islamic Microfinance in Poverty Alleviation in Pakistan: An 
Empirical Approach. International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, 
Finance and Management Sciences 4, 143–152. 
Banerjee, A.V., Duflo, E., Glennerster, R., Kinnan, C., 2013. The Miracle of 
Microfinance? Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation (SSRN Scholarly Paper 
No. ID 2250500). Social Science Research Network, Rochester, NY. 
Bo, A.D., Bignami, D.F., 2014. Sustainable Social, Economic and Environmental 
Revitalization in Multan City: A Multidisciplinary Italian–Pakistani Project. 
Springer Science & Business Media. 
Brau, J.C., Woller, G.M., 2004. Microfinance: A Comprehensive Review of the Existing 
Literature. Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance 9, 1–28. 
Chartered Professional Accountants Canada, 2012. Guide to Accounting Standards for 
Not-for-Profit Organizations in Canada. CICA, Canada. 
Commercial Verses Cooperative Microfinance Program: An Investigation of Efficiency, 
Performance and Sustainability by The Dialogue on iBooks [WWW Document], 
n.d. . iBooks. URL https://itunes.apple.com/us/book/commercial-verses-
cooperative/id480515207?mt=11 (accessed 12.11.15). 
Conning, J., 1999. Outreach, sustainability and leverage in monitored and peer-monitored 
lending. Journal of Development Economics 60, 51–77. doi:10.1016/S0304-
3878(99)00036-X 
Dogarawa, A.B., 2010. Poverty Alleviation Through Zakah and Waqf Institutions (SSRN 
Scholarly Paper No. ID 1622133). Social Science Research Network, Rochester, 
NY. 
El-Zoghbi, M., Badawi, S., 2015. Sharia-Compliant Microfinance: 5 Takeaways from 
CGAP’s Research. CGAP. 
Farooqi, Usman, 2015. Accounting Standard For Not-For-Profit Organizations. 
Gaudiosi, M., 1988. Influence of the Islamic Law of WAQF on the Development of the 
Trust In England: The Case of Merton College. University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 136, 1231. 
Harper, M., 2011. Akhuwat: A Case Study. Akhuwat.org. 
Hulme, D., Arun, T., 2009. Microfinance: A Reader. Routledge. 
Iqbal, M., 2002. Islamic Economic Institutions and the Elimination of Poverty. Islamic 
Foundation. 
 
Kabeer, N., Waddington, H., 2015. Economic impacts of conditional cash transfer 
programmes: a systematic review and meta-analysis. Journal of Development 
Effectiveness 7, 290–303. doi:10.1080/19439342.2015.1068833 
	   52	  
Karim, N., 2008. Islamic Microfinance: An Emerging Market Niche [WWW Document]. 
CGAP. URL http://www.cgap.org/publications/islamic-microfinance-emerging-
market-niche (accessed 12.11.15). 
Kazim, S.S., Haider, S.E., 2012. Islamic Micro-Finance Models and Their Viability in 
Pakistan. Micro note. 
Kornai*, J., 1986. The Soft Budget Constraint. Kyklos 39, 3–30. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
6435.1986.tb01252.x 
Lascelles, D., Mendelson, S., 2012. Microfinance Banana Skins 2012, THE CSFI survey 
of microfinance risk. CSFI, London. 
Ledgerwood, J., 2014. Microfinance Handbook: An Institutional and Financial 
Perspective. World Bank Publications. 
Morduch, J., 2000. The Microfinance Schism. World Development 28, 617–629. 
doi:10.1016/S0305-750X(99)00151-5 
Munir, K., n.d. Akhuwat: Making Microfinance Work (SSIR) [WWW Document]. URL 
http://ssir.org/articles/entry/akhuwat_making_microfinance_work (accessed 
12.11.15). 
Pakistan’s Wasil Foundation Wins Islamic Microfinance Challenge, 2014. . CGAP. 
Rawlings, L.B., Rubio, G.M., 2005. Evaluating the Impact of Conditional Cash Transfer 
Programs. World Bank Res Obs 20, 29–55. doi:10.1093/wbro/lki001 
Robinson, M.S., 1996. Addressing some key questions on finance and poverty. J. Int. 
Dev. 8, 153–161. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-1328(199603)8:2<153::AID-
JID372>3.0.CO;2-6 
Saqib, A., 2012. Dr. Amjad Saqib-Akhuwat (Brotherhood). [video online] Available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1xO3rHLhFMg [Accessed 22 November 
2015] 
Shirazi, N., Obaidullah, M., Haneef, M., 2015. Integration of Waqf and Islamic 
Microfinance for Poverty Reduction: Case of Pakistan. Islamic Research and 
Training Institute, IRTI Working Paper Series. 
The Social and Financial Performance of Conventional and Islamic Microfinance 
Institutions in Pakistan [WWW Document], n.d. URL 
https://www.academia.edu/8129053/The_Social_and_Financial_Performance_of_
Conventional_and_Islamic_Microfinance_Institutions_in_Pakistan (accessed 
12.11.15). 
Tuan, M.T., 2008. Measuring and/or estimating social value creation: Insights into eight 
integrated cost approaches. Final Paper. Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. 
Seattle, Washington. 
Woller, G.M., Dunford, C. and Woodworth, W., 1999. Where to 
 microfinance. International Journal of Economic Development, 1(1), pp.29-
 64. 
 
 
